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Regionalism and bilateral free trade agreements have become 
noticeably prominent since the collapse of the Cancun ministerial 
meeting of the World Trade Organization in 2003 and the subsequent 
suspension of Doha Round negotiations in 2006.  The number of 
bilateral and regional trade agreements reported to the GATT/WTO 
has increased from 20 in 1990 to 86 in 2000 and to 159 in 2007.  Most 
have been agreements between pairs or groups of either developed 
or developing countries but an increasing number of free trade 
agreements have been between developed and developing 
countries.  All major economies have negotiated a number of 
bilateral trade agreements and, not surprisingly, the trends is being 
replicated also in the Asia Pacific region as China and Japan 
embrace the idea of linking the regional economies in a series of hub 
and spokes bilateral deals.  This development sits at odds with the 
stated objectives of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to 
promote regional integration and free trade.  Increasingly, APEC 
looks like an entity that is adrift without purpose and direction and, 
yet, APEC member economies have also invested considerably in the 
APEC process for them to allow it to be completely overwhelmed by 
the focus on bilateralism.   APEC is able to draw together world 
leaders to an annual summit and this in itself provides a wonderful 
opportunity to initiate dialogue and develop joint policy initiatives.  
If there is any deficiency it is in the lack of a sense of identity and 
purpose and if APEC is to have long term viability it will have to 
address that basic weakness. 
The first APEC ministerial level meeting was in 1989 and included 
twelve countries around the Pacific Rim, including the United 
States.  This meeting was a culmination of efforts by Australia and 
Japan to build an inclusive structure of regional cooperation and to 
pre-empt an exclusively Asian regional framework that would 
exclude Australia, New Zealand and the United States.   The Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir Mohammad, however, formally 
proposed an exclusive East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in 1990.  
This was seen as divisive and immediately rejected by Japan, 
Australia and the US.  Both Japan and Australia maintained close 
security links with the United States and wanted American 
involvement in any regional grouping.  There was, as well, mutual 
affinity between them as a result of their fringe status within the 
Asian region.  Japan was on the psychological fringe as a result of its 
wartime atrocities and Australia was regarded by many as essentially 
a European outpost in Asia.  As ‘fringe-dwellers’, these two 
countries were natural allies and they conceived of APEC as a useful 
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vehicle for an integrationist strategy and to bridge the divide 
between Asian and the so-called non-Asian states.  
APEC acquired prominence and substance in 1993 when President 
Bill Clinton invited APEC leaders to a summit meeting in Seattle.  
This was, to a large extent, an attempt to breathe life into the 
stalled Uruguay Round trade talks of the General Agreement on 
tariffs and Trade (GATT).  The expectation was that APEC and the 
prospect of Asian regionalism might pressure the European Union to 
offer additional concessions on agriculture or risk the division of the 
world into distinct trading blocs. At the 1993 summit, leaders called 
for continued reduction of barriers trade and investment, 
envisioning a community in the Asia-Pacific to promote economic 
prosperity through cooperation.  Whether or not the APEC summit 
was instrumental, the Uruguay Round talks were brought to a 
completion at the end of the year.  Since then, APEC summits have 
become an annual affair and cap the 100 odd low level regional 
meetings through the year. 
APEC has emerged as a grouping in direct opposition to the proposed 
EAEC and it was gradually invested with values in sharp contrast to 
the closed nature of the proposed EAEC and, indeed, to all 
contemporary forms of regionalism.   Thus APEC was to be inclusive 
rather than exclusive, both in membership and in terms of any trade 
concessions that might be forthcoming.  The principle of non 
discrimination, a bedrock of WTO multilateralism, was also the 
centrepiece of APEC and it was agreed that any trade concession 
agreed upon by APEC members would be applicable also to the wider 
international community.  Alone among all existing regional entities, 
APEC was to be consistent with multilateral ideals of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).  Its basic principles were codified at the 
Seoul ministerial meeting in 1991, that APEC should be the regional 
instrument to: 
1. sustain economic prosperity in the Asia Pacific region 
2. enhance economic interdependence 
3. develop and strengthen the multilateral trade regime, and 
4. reduce trade and investment barriers in harmony with GATT 
[WTO] principles. 
The following year, in Indonesia, APEC leaders agreed to the Bogor 
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Declaration to create regional free trade by 2020.  They also 
reiterated their commitment to open regionalism and declared that 
the “outcome of trade and investment liberalization in Asia Pacific 
will not only be the actual reduction of barriers among APEC 
economies but also between APEC economies and non-APEC 
economies.”  As such, it promised not simply to divert regional trade 
away from non regional countries but that if there was to be any 
benefit flowing from reduction of trade barriers it would come 
instead from trade creation, not trade diversion.  Critics of 
regionalism rail against trade diversionary effects of free trade 
agreements but APEC promised to deflect these criticisms by laying 
the foundation for regional and global trade creation, benefiting 
both members and non-members. 
Subsequently, it was agreed that each country would produce its 
own independent action plan to achieve free trade by the target 
date.  This was a very flexible approach to trade liberalization and 
was necessitated by the different economic circumstance of member 
economies and by the difficulty in devising a common template for 
goal realization.  However, despite rhetorical niceties, APEC leaders 
failed also to clearly explain ‘open regionalism’ or even to explain 
why free trade should be extended unilaterally to non-APEC 
members when even the GATT/WTO preferred a negotiated and 
reciprocal approach to trade liberalization.  These ambiguities were 
initially glossed over but a retreat from the noble principle was 
inevitable.  Shortly after the agreement to establish regional free 
trade, the Australian government declared that its liberalization 
agenda was contingent on that of other regional countries.  This 
brought reciprocity right back into the core of open regionalism.   
The Asian financial crisis and economic setback in several APEC 
member economies stalled progress towards free trade and, today, 
the objective may receive lip service but the idea no longer occupies 
the center of attention for APEC leaders.  In the interim however, 
there have been some positive achievements, such as the Business 
Travel Card Scheme (BTCS) which allow holders of the travel card 
easier and streamlined access to APEC economies.  In 2007 
seventeen APEC members participated in the BTCS, with the 
exception of United States, Canada, Mexico and Russia. 
Open regionalism was conceived primarily in the context of regional 
free trade but if the idea had a natural carry over to the issue of 
membership, APEC suddenly declared a moratorium on membership 
expansion, initially in 1994 for a three year period and then again 
Page 6 
for a further ten year period in the 1998.  The moratorium was 
grounded in a belief that a “…fundamental problem of APEC was 
that it grew too fast without solidifying its core objectives, and its 
members differed on what APEC should do.” Before the second 
moratorium went into effect, many new countries joined APEC, 
including Russia but since then membership has remained frozen at 
21 states.  At the 2007 APEC summit, the moratorium was extended 
another three years which means that countries eager to 
participate, such as India, will have to wait until the 2010 APEC 
summit meeting in Japan. 
The moratorium on membership was intended ostensibly to facilitate 
a deepening of cooperative behavior within APEC and without the 
distraction of size expansion.  Instead of any deepening of economic 
interaction as a direct result of APEC participation, APEC today 
stands as a hollow shell, devoid of any real content.  There are still 
platitudes aplenty.  The US espouses the virtues of APEC by pointing 
out that two-third of American exports go to the Asia Pacific region.   
China joined APEC in 1991 and claims to have benefited from it and 
Australia, having contributed much to its formation still finds it 
useful to make upbeat pronouncements about APEC.  And yet, apart 
from the ‘meet and greet’ function of summit diplomacy and the 
photo opportunity that comes with it, APEC has produced no real 
and meaningful achievement.  It was strangely silent at the height of 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and today, when regional and 
bilateral initiatives seem to be flourishing, APEC itself remains 
rudderless and without a clear sense of direction. 
As a hollow shell in search of substance, the 2007 summit meeting in 
Sydney became an important occasion to review the forum’s 
activities and chart a way forward.  The Sydney summit was a 
‘homecoming’ for APEC after nearly fifteen years travelling through 
East Asia and the Americas.  It was an important occasion for 
Australia to assume leadership and reinvigorate the faltering APEC 
process.  In that context, former Australian Prime Minister Paul 
Keating, a leading figure in the early years of APEC diplomacy urged 
that Australia should reposition the forum as a tool for managing 
security threats in East and Northeast Asia.  Others suggested that 
APEC should try, just as in 1993, to restart the stalled Doha Round 
trade negotiations by rekindling the idea of a Free Trade Area of the 
Asia Pacific (FTAAP) to put pressure on WTO members to conclude 
the Doha Round.  According to Fred Bergsten,  
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…the Doha Round is faltering badly.  It now seems unlikely to 
achieve even minimal success without a ‘political jolt’ of the type 
that an FTAAP launch by the APEC Leaders could provide.  The 
model is the Leaders’ adoption of the goal of ‘free and open trade 
and investment in the region,’ at the first APEC summit in Seattle in 
1993, that galvanized the successful completion of the Uruguay 
Round in the GATT shortly thereafter.    
Indeed, WTO Director General Pascal Lamy was in attendance at the 
APEC summit to secure commitments of support for trade 
multilateralism but APEC was not in a position to break the deadlock 
within the WTO because the two leading players representing 
Southern interests in multilateral trade talks, Brazil and India, were 
not participants in the APEC process.  India’s membership 
application has been held up by the moratorium on membership 
expansion.  The Davos meeting in Switzerland in February 2007 had 
led to a resumption of Doha Round negotiations on a bilateral basis 
between US, EU, India and Brazil but that was not a possibility at 
the APEC meeting in September. 
As host, Prime Minister John Howard, had determined that his 
domestic political fortunes would be better served if APEC leaders 
agreed to some aspirational targets on reducing greenhouse gases as 
a way of managing climate change.  Prior to the summit, he set the 
stage by ambitiously declaring that Sydney would be “…one of the 
most important international gatherings of leaders to discuss climate 
change since the 1992 Rio conference.”   In the end, the Sydney 
Declaration did espouse the ideal of reversing environmental 
degradation through an aspirational target of a 25 per cent 
reduction in greenhouse gases by 2030.  The Sydney Declaration on 
climate change was criticized by environmentalists for not specifying 
binding targets on green house gas emissions.  However for the 
Australian government it marked an important step toward a post-
Kyoto climate agreement based not on binding targets but 
aspirational targets based on a country’s particular economic 
circumstances.  The Australian government, having refused to ratify 
the Kyoto Agreement has since maintained that any successful 
climate change agreement had to move away from binding targets in 
favour of individual action plans based on prevailing conditions.  The 
Sydney Declaration did not commit governments to any plan of 
action and the Chinese President Hu Jintao also restated his 
government’s position that the UN, not APEC, should be the main 
vehicle for global environmental agreements.  Simon Tay of the 
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Singapore Institute of International Affairs added his commentary 
that the ‘E’ in APEC stands for Economics, not Environment. 
The Sydney summit failed to produce any meaningful framework for 
action and APEC, instead, provided a convenient opportunity to 
conclude a number of important bilateral agreements between the 
host country and resource-hungry China and Russia.  For Australia, 
the Sydney summit was hugely successful as it produced billion 
dollar export agreements but this success represented the upstaging 
of the main event by bilateral ‘sideline’ agreements.  If anything, 
the Sydney summit was reduced to a marketing convention to sell 
Australian resources, an outcome that will ironically undermine any 
aspirational target for reducing greenhouse gases.  The Sydney 
summit failed to produce any meaningful consensus on the economic 
front with the exception of a broad reference to continue 
negotiations on a regional preferential trade agreement.  The intent 
was to pressure the supposedly ‘intransigent’ and ‘dissident’ WTO 
members, India and Brazil primarily but also South Africa and 
Argentina, to conclude the Doha Round or risk global segmentation 
into trade blocs, or risk being frozen out of the Asia Pacific region, a 
region that accounted for about 60 per cent of global GDP.  Even if 
the target countries were leaders of the so-called Group of Twenty 
(G20) developing countries, in reality, the Doha Round had been 
jeopardized not by the developing countries but by the US and EU 
and their refusal to scale back in any meaningful way, domestic 
subsidies and high tariffs barriers to developing country exports.  
Peter Mandelson the EU Trade Commissioner remarked recently that 
“We are in a stalemate…and I believe that the US holds the key to 
unlocking it.”  Even if we take the position that the first APEC 
summit in 1993 had contributed, in some small way perhaps, to 
completion of the Uruguay Round, the 2007 APEC summit is unlikely 
to have any great impact on the determined stand taken by the G20. 
When the 2007 APEC summit meeting ended, there was considerably 
backslapping in the Australian media about the commercial 
successes and bilateral deals.  Yet, none of these could be directly 
attributed to APEC.  The Chinese trade deal, worth A$45 billion to 
the Australian economy, can be attributed to China’s voracious 
appetite for resources to fuel its surging economy, and the 
agreement to export Australian uranium to Russia can similarly be 
attributed to Russia power generation needs.  These deals would 
have materialized regardless, and APEC simply provided a highly 
visible venue for signing the trade accords.   
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CONCLUSION 
APEC is a multilateral forum and it must develop a suitable 
multilateral agenda and focus.  At present it remains a forum 
without a defining role or purpose.  The agenda of open liberalism is 
no longer a driving force within APEC and members realize that just 
as agreement for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is being 
held up by differences and policy priorities, the FTAP is similarly 
handicapped by disputes within the Asia Pacific region.  At the same 
time, as long as members are prepared to invest in annual summit 
diplomacy, it is a forum with considerable latent potential.  The 
meet and greet function is important and APEC members are not 
likely to turn their backs on fifteen years of summit diplomacy.  Yet, 
it is important to remind ourselves that the nature of global 
economic relations has changed compared to the early 1990s when 
APEC was conceived.   
APEC was conceived as a bridge spanning the assumed divide 
between Asian and non-Asian countries of Asia but that assumption 
no longer provides a guide for future action.  A divide based on race 
(Asians versus Caucasians) is untenable even if some Asian countries 
continue to worry about Australian and New Zealand participation in 
regional forums.  Prior to the first East Asian Summit (EAS) in 
December 2005, there was considerable political manoeuvring to 
exclude Australia and New Zealand but their participation had to be 
begrudgingly accepted when Australia agreed to sign the ASEAN 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.   
The racial divide is unhelpful and the main divide in the global 
economy today is that between developed and developing countries.  
There are not many broad based multilateral institutions, like APEC, 
that include both developed and developing countries.  There are 
some issue specific broad based groupings, such as the Cairns Group 
(CG) on agriculture which include countries on either end of the 
development spectrum but CG has not been a forceful actor in 
international trade diplomacy since the mid 1990s.  It was formed in 
the mid 1980s to campaign for farm liberalization and lobbied hard 
for its preferred position in the Uruguay Round trade negotiations 
but in the Doha Round has conceded that ground to the Group of 
twenty (G20) composed exclusively of developing countries.   Given 
the earlier failure of CG in achieving liberal farm trade, developing 
countries abandoned their collaborative bargaining strategy to form 
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an exclusively developing country grouping and the G20, led by 
Brazil and India, has emerged as a key player in the Doha Round of 
trade negotiations. 
The assumptions that underpinned the formation of the APEC may no 
longer be very relevant but, as mentioned above, the institution is 
unlikely therefore to disappear.  If it is to have relevance and 
meaning for the future it will have to re-invent a role for itself.  As 
the only multilateral institution able to attract key leaders from 
across the developed and developing countries APEC could possibly 
position itself as part of a two-step negotiating process between 
developed and developing countries.  The principal demand of 
developing countries is farm liberalization and access to western 
markets but negotiations within the Doha Round have also made 
clear that this will be long process that will ultimately only be 
resolved by a ‘better generation’ than ours.  Agricultural 
liberalization and a more equitable trade regime is a long term 
agenda but it is possible for APEC to become a part of that process.  
The first step might involve negotiations among the developing 
countries members of APEC and the readily available sub-forum 
might be the ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ (APT), which includes Japan, China, 
South Korea, followed by the second step of bargaining and 
negotiation at the APEC summit meetings.  Ideally this two stage 
negotiating strategy should include India as one of the leaders of the 
G20 but regional sensitivities and APEC moratorium preclude this for 
the time being.  But it is not an issue that can be ignored for very 
long and India and China will have to settle or set aside their 
differences so that they can work together within the APEC process.   
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